Climate: How do MEPs vote?

The European elections in May 2019 were marked by a shift towards the centre of majority forces in the European Parliament and the intensification of environmental challenges. The “green wave”, which received much media coverage, confirmed that the EU is, in the opinion of its citizens, the appropriate level to tackle issues related to environmental protection and the fight against climate change. These elections resulted in a significant increase of MEPs in centrist groups (Renew Europe) and greens (the Greens - European Free Alliance - “Greens/EFA”), thereby shattering the traditional bipartisan centre-right (European People’s Party - “EPP”) / centre-left (Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats - “S&D”) majority.

Two years after the start of this new term of office and following on from studies conducted ahead of the 2019 elections, the Political Observatory of the European Parliament established by the Jacques Delors Institute in Paris, in which Europe Jacques Delors (Brussels) takes part, commissioned from the VoteWatch Institute this analysis of plenary votes cast in the European Parliament with regard to the key proposals and reports for the implementation of the Green Deal. A study of these votes allows for an assessment of the interface between the aforementioned political reconfigurations and the growing importance of environmental topics in the Parliament with a view to observing the new political fault lines on these issues. The study also focuses on the specific positions of French MEPs for each of the selected votes and in each of the groups in which French MEPs are present.

The results of this study highlight four main points:

- A clear and unbroken fault line between progressives (S&D, Greens, the Left) and conservatives (EPP, European Conservatives and Reformists - “ECR”) in addition to Identity and Democracy (ID) regarding most environmental issues, including votes of principle and major topics: initiatives regarding the 60% carbon emissions reduction by 2030 in relation to 1990 levels, carbon neutrality by 2050 and negative carbon emissions after 2050.

- The pivotal role of the centrist Renew Europe group, new “kingmaker” at the European Parliament in this area, which, according to the topics and challenges, either shares the positions of the progressives (acknowledging the shortcomings of the current certification scheme to combat deforestation), or sides with the conservatives (opposing monetary penalties for non-compliance with due diligence obligations). The positions of this group which is the successor of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), heavily dominated by the French delegation of the La République en Marche movement, sometimes reflect the political stances of the French executive.

- A national ridge line that transcends political groups. This is most visible when it comes to the energy transition. The continuation of high-carbon energy mixes in Eastern European countries (for instance, Poland’s energy mix is still 80% dependent on coal) sheds light on some national delegations’ opposition during votes on EU climate neutrality targets for 2050, the conditioning of transition fund allocation on the achievement of European climate objectives and on the option of investing in natural gas through the Just Transition Fund.

- Dissent on a case-by-case basis. While the political outlines of the European Green Deal have garnered a kind of consensus among the progressive groups (the Left, S&D, the Greens-EFA, Renew Europe), the conditions of its implementation do, however, give rise to greater dissent within groups and delegations. Voting on the green conditionality of Just Transition funding or of the European Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism have led conservative groups and some progressive MEPs to take a stance against the objectives and spirit of the Green Deal. This was particularly the case during the plenary vote on the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) resolution, when, due to pressure from certain industrial lobbies, the EPP succeeded in having the statement concerning the need to eliminate the current measures to combat carbon leakage removed from the final text (allocations of CO2 emissions granted free of charge, under the EU ETS - the EU Emissions Trading System -, to the major emitting industries). This amendment which curtails the final text actually significantly undermines its legal soundness. On this sensitive issue, it is clear that the Renew Europe group is divided, although only a minority of Renew Europe MEPs ultimately voted in favour of maintaining the free allocations following the implementation of the CBAM.

At the end of the day, the case of the CBAM is only one example of the fragile nature of the progressive and pro-environment coalition of the European Parliament with regard to certain technical subjects. As with almost all of the votes studied, it bears witness to the persistence of a firm opposition expressed by conservative groups (some national delegations of the EPP, the ECR group and the ID group) to the strengthening of European ambitions regarding carbon reduction and environmental protection.

The study also highlights the key role played by the delegation of French MEPs in the Renew Europe group, an essential instrument for French influence in the definition of the group’s political priorities, and more broadly of the 2019-2024 term of office. In closing, French MEPs, regardless of their group, express their positions on a “case-by-case” basis regarding environmental issues, relatively emancipated from group positions.