Executive Summary
The European Union’s agri-food sector has reached a critical juncture as farmers confront significant environmental, economic and geopolitical challenges. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the EU’s main instrument for supporting farmers’ income, has come under increasing pressure to address a motley array of competing ecological, social and economic priorities. Despite numerous reforms, the CAP is often seen as resistant to change due to entrenched interests and institutional structures.
The following discussion paper focuses on the most recent, post-2020 reform of the CAP and the institutional power dynamics between the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union that shaped the reform process. By detailing how the three institutions develop their respective internal position on legislative proposals and interact with each other, both formally and informally, the paper sheds further light on how decision-makers forged agreements on the most recent CAP reform.
It also takes a closer look at the broader context in which the decision-making process took place by analysing some of the external factors, such as the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) negotiations, the European Green Deal, and the role of lobbying and advocacy by various interest groups, which impacted the legislative process and the final policy outcome of the post-2020 CAP.
As our analysis shows, the following takeaways should be considered in future negotiations on the CAP:
• A bold proposal by the European Commission for a greener CAP. A strategically framed Commission proposal can set the terms of the debate, guide negotiations, and embed ambitious environmental objectives from the outset. By drawing on thorough evidence, broad consultations, and cross-DG coordination, the Commission can anticipate resistance and steer the reform process towards clear, measurable, and legally binding climate and environmental targets. Furthermore, under the new delivery model, the Commission’s role in approving national strategic plans provides additional leverage during inter-institutional negotiations.
• The importance of a coherent institutional position within the European Commission during negotiations. A coherent institutional position is key to enhancing negotiating power, while internal divisions, such as those seen in the Commission during the last CAP reform, undermine credibility and dilute environmental ambitions. To avoid this, the next reform should be prepared through robust inter-service coordination and political alignment among key Commissioners, particularly those responsible for agriculture, the clean transition, and cohesion. Any internal disagreements must be resolved ahead of trilogues, which are not the place for intra-institutional disputes.
• Ensuring sincere and loyal cooperation during negotiations. During the last CAP reform, the European Council’s influence, through its MFF conclusions, undermined the European Parliament’s role and limited room for genuine trilogue negotiations between the Council of the European Union, the Parliament and the Commission. To avoid a repetition, future reforms should be grounded in sincere and loyal cooperation, with all institutions respecting the balance set by the Treaties. The Commission should take a more assertive role in safeguarding the legislative prerogatives of each institution by resisting undue pre-emption of negotiations by Heads of State and Government gathered within the European Council.
• Optimising cooperation between committees in the European Parliament, with enhanced analytical and negotiating capabilities. The associated committee procedure involving the Committee on the Environment (ENVI) and the Committee on Agriculture (AGRI) during the last CAP reform proved inefficient. These inefficiencies contributed to its removal. Future cooperation could rely on ENVI acting as an opinion-giving committee, with enhanced informal coordination with AGRI to ensure targeted input. To effectively integrate environmental priorities, political groups could focus on appointing strong shadow rapporteurs within AGRI and reinforce their work with solid analytical support.
• Improved policymaking through more transparency, depolarisation and broader participation. Broadening stakeholder engagement, depolarising the debate and increasing transparency within the agriculture and food sector are key to shifting away from status quo dynamics and fostering a more sustainable CAP. Achieving this shift will depend on the Commission’s ability to facilitate inclusive dialogue, mediate between competing priorities, and build trust among fragmented stakeholders across the agri-food system.
